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Abstract 
The rise of deep learning has brought artificial intelligence (AI) to the forefront. The ultimate goal of AI is to 
realize machines with human mind and consciousness, but existing achievements mainly simulate intelligent 
behavior on computer platforms. These achievements all belong to weak AI rather than strong AI. How to 
achieve strong AI is not known yet in the field of intelligence science. Currently, this field is calling for a 
new paradigm, especially Theory of Cognitive Relativity (TCR). The TCR aims to summarize a simple and 
elegant set of first principles about the nature of intelligence, at least including the Principle of World’s 
Relativity and the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity. The Principle of World’s Relativity states that the 
subjective world an intelligent agent can observe is strongly constrained by the way it perceives the objective 
world. The Principle of Symbol’s Relativity states that an intelligent agent can use any physical symbol 
system to express what it observes in its subjective world. The two principles are derived from scientific 
facts and life experience. Thought experiments show that they are important to understand high-level 
intelligence and necessary to establish a scientific theory of mind and consciousness. Rather than brain-like 
intelligence, the TCR indeed advocates a promising change in direction to realize true AI, i.e. artificial 
general intelligence or artificial consciousness, particularly different from humans’ and animals’. 
Furthermore, a TCR creed has been presented and extended to reveal the secrets of consciousness and to 
guide realization of conscious machines. In the sense that true AI could be diversely implemented in a brain-
different way, the TCR would probably drive an intelligence revolution in combination with some additional 
first principles. 
 
Keywords: Artificial intelligence, artificial general intelligence, artificial consciousness, first principle, 
intelligence science, objective world, principle of world’s relativity, principle of symbol’s relativity, 
subjective world, theory of cognitive relativity 
 
 2 
1.  Introduction 
Alan Turing is widely considered to be the father of theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence 
(AI) (Beavers2013). By a seminal paper (Turing 1950), he introduced the Turing test to help answer the 
question “can a machine think?” and started interest to realize a machine with human intelligence. Recently, 
deep learning, esp. with the success of AlphaGo, has renewed the interest again (LeCun et al. 2015; Mnih et 
al. 2015; Silver et al. 2016), but still far from the ultimate goal to achieve human mind and consciousness 
(Lake et al. 2017). In computer science, intelligence that machines display is called AI, or machine 
intelligence, in contrast to the natural intelligence of humans and other animals. AI research is defined as the 
study of intelligent agents: any device that perceives its environment and takes actions that maximize its 
chance of successfully achieving its goals. 
Synthetically, the goals of AI research include reasoning, knowledge representation, planning, learning, 
natural language processing, perception and the ability to move and manipulate objects (Nilsson 1998). The 
basic claim of the AI field is that human intelligence can be so precisely described that a machine can be 
made to simulate it. General intelligence is among the field’s long-term goals (Kurzweil 2005), drawing 
upon computer science, mathematics, psychology, linguistics, philosophy and many others. There have been 
three major approaches to AI: symbolism (Simon 1995), behaviorism (Brooks 1990; 1991a; 1991b), and 
connectionism (Rumelhart et al. 1986). Symbolism is predicated on the preeminence of reasoning-like 
process and conceptualization. It aims to build disembodied intelligence from high-level symbolic 
representations, which can only interact with the world via keyboard, screen, or printer. Moreover, it claims 
that human intelligence can be realized by a computer program and even that the running of the right 
algorithms on a computer would give rise to consciousness. Behaviorism denies reasoning and 
conceptualization (Kirsh 1991), attempting to build embodied (or robotic) intelligence that can interact with 
the real world instead of the constructed worlds by symbols. Connectionism denies that reason-like processes 
are preeminent in cognition and that core AI is the study of the concepts underpinning domain understanding 
(Kirsh 1991). It tries to recognize real patterns and represent mental phenomena using artificial neural 
networks. 
A fundamental problem in AI is that nobody really knows what intelligence is, despite innumerable tests 
available for measuring it (Gregory 1998). For people, intelligence is a very general mental capability that, 
 3 
among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend 
complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience (Gottfredson 1997). Although the details are debated 
about the definition of intelligence, a fair degree of consensus has been scientifically reached from many 
respects of natural intelligence and machine intelligence. Most generally, intelligence measures an agent’s 
ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments (Legg & Hutter 2007). In history, there were a lot of 
philosophical explorations about the nature of intelligence (Sternberg 1990). For example, Plato likened 
people’s intelligence to blocks of wax, differing in size, hardness, moistness, and purity. Thomas Aquinas 
thought that people’s intelligence could not approach the omniscience of God. Immanuel Kant believed that 
people's intelligence is different in kinds and facets. It should be mentioned that, Newell and Simon (1976) 
formulated a well-known hypothesis for intelligence in their Turing Award paper. The hypothesis, i.e. the 
physical symbol system hypothesis (PSSH), states that a physical symbol system has the necessary and 
sufficient means for general intelligent action. Note that a physical symbol system, also called a formal 
system, can be a digital computer, which takes physical patterns (symbols), combining them into structures 
(expressions) and manipulating them to produce new expressions. 
The PSSH has been heavily attacked by "Chinese room" (Searle 1980), "nouvelle AI" (Brooks 1990; 
1991a; 1991b), and other arguments. These arguments cluster around four main themes (Nilsson 2007), 
advocating that biological intelligence involves meaningful grounding, non-symbolic processing, brain-style 
mechanisms, and mindless chemical activity. In particular, the Chinese room thought experiment shows that 
a physical symbol system is not the sufficient condition for general intelligent action (e.g. understanding, 
intentionality, mind and consciousness), and the nouvelle AI approach shows that a physical symbol system 
is not the necessary condition for general intelligent action (e.g. insect-level robotic intelligence without 
symbolic representations). Thus, a physical symbol system should certainly differ from a biological 
intelligent system, even though it beats human Go champions (Silver et al. 2016). In reality, existing AI 
achievements mainly simulate intelligent behavior on computer platforms. They belong to weak AI rather 
than strong AI. Originally, strong AI is a position that the appropriately programmed computer really is a 
mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other 
cognitive states (Searle 1980).  Another version of strong AI states that the appropriately programmed 
computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human 
beings have minds (Searle 1992). In contrast, weak AI claims that a computer would not necessarily have a 
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mind and consciousness, even it is a super-intelligent machine like AlphaGo Zero (Silver et al. 2017; 2018). 
Additionally, strong AI may refer to a machine with consciousness, sentience and mind. And it may also 
mean artificial general intelligence (or full AI), i.e. a machine with the ability to apply intelligence to any 
problem, rather than just one specific problem. However, weak AI is known as narrow AI (or applied AI), i.e. 
AI that focuses only on a limited task. 
To make the PSSH stand further, the attacks to it are also refuted (Nilsson 2007). One refutation is 
focused on what symbols are. In this refutation, symbols are a set of entities that can be physical patterns 
(e.g., chalk marks). , they can even occur as components of symbol structures. Symbol structures can, and 
commonly do, serve as internal representations (e.g., mental images) of the environment (Simon 2000). So, 
the "symbols" are physical objects that represent things in the world, symbols (e.g., "dog") that have a 
recognizable meaning or denotation, and even more complex symbols that are composed of simple symbols. 
Thus, a physical symbol system exists in a world of objects wider than just these symbolic expressions 
themselves, and produces an evolving collection of symbol structures grounded in the objects in the 
environment through its perceiving and effecting capabilities whenever necessary. 
However, is there no difference between a physical object and a physical symbol? In fact, the start of 
human intelligence is not with symbols. Human neonates cannot speak any word at all. By crying 
instinctively, infants can express a variety of feelings (Chicot 2015), such as hunger, discomfort, or 
loneliness. Moreover, they may pay more attention to danger (Erlich et al. 2013), and receive more benefits 
from positive touch (Field 2002). In Dunstan's theory, infants make sound reflexes between 0-3 months, but 
more elaborate babbling after 3 months. Hence, in the development of intelligence, humans must have 
conscious experience before language acquisition. Additionally, in genetic epistemology, Piaget (1972) 
distinguished among three types of knowledge: physical, logical-mathematical, and social knowledge. 
Physical knowledge refers to knowledge related to objects in the world, which can be gained through 
perceptual properties. Logical-mathematical knowledge is abstract and must be invented, but through actions 
on objects that are fundamentally different from those actions enabling physical knowledge. Social 
knowledge is culture-specific and can be learned only from other people within one's cultural group. 
Since humans acquire physical knowledge prior to the other two types of knowledge, physical objects 
must be different from physical symbols. Therefore, it still remains to answer many questions concerning the 
PSSH and AI, such as: 1) What is the difference between physical objects and physical symbols? 2) Can 
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machines have conscious experience about physical objects without physical symbols? 3) What physical 
forms of language can machines use to develop their conscious intelligence? These questions are significant 
in the field of intelligence science, which is currently calling for a new paradigm, especially “Theory of 
Cognitive Relativity (TCR)” (Li 2005). 
The TCR aims to elucidate the nature of intelligence with a simple and elegant set of first principles at 
the system level. These first principles must be fundamental and compatible in all phenomena of intelligence, 
and cannot be deduced from any other principles in physics, chemistry and biology. Although the set of first 
principles would not result in anything like Maxwell’s equations or mas-energy relation 
2E mc , it should 
capture the nature of intelligence comprehensively in some perspectives between science and philosophy. 
Moreover, it should make a guide to realization of machines with conscious intelligence, particularly 
different from humans’ and animals’. Only “human-different” AI can be regarded as a genuine innovation, 
whereas “human-like” AI is just a kind of imitation. Rather than brain-like intelligence (Sendhoff 2009), the 
TCR indeed advocate a promising change in direction to realize true AI, i.e. artificial general intelligence or 
artificial consciousness. This realization should be brain-different, not based on imitation of humans and 
animals. Note the quest for artificial flight succeeded when the Wright brothers and others stopped imitating 
birds and started using wind tunnels and learning about aerodynamics (Russell & Norvig, 2011). 
So far, the TCR has included two first principles: the Principle of World’s Relativity and the Principle of 
Symbol’s Relativity. In Section 2, the Principle of World’s Relativity is presented about conscious 
experience, stating that the subjective world an intelligent agent can observe is strongly constrained by the 
way it perceives the objective world. In Section 3, the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity is presented about 
information expression, stating that an intelligent agent can use any physical symbol system to express what 
it observes in its subjective world. In Section 4, thought experiments are designed to demonstrate that the 
two principles are important to understand high-level intelligence and necessary to establish a scientific 
theory of mind and consciousness. Section 5 is an extraction of insights for true AI. Section 6 is a TCT creed 
for consciousness studies. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7, anticipating that the TCR would combine 
some additional first principles to form a new paradigm for intelligence science, and that it would probably 
drive an intelligence revolution in the future. 
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2. The Principle of World's Relativity 
The most important aspect of mind is consciousness and our conscious experience of self and world. 
Intuitively, there exists an external world around us. The problem of why it looks like our observation is the 
central issue of this section. First, the human world is defined as the observable part of the universe, with the 
anthropic principle discussed. Second, an animal world is defined likewise on the basis of scientific facts. 
Third, the Principle of World’s Relativity is presented as a generalization of the the anthropic principle. Last, 
the principle is applied to make the difference between phyical objects and physical symbols. 
 
2.1. Human world 
What exactly is the external world around us? A simple anwer is the universe, which may refer to such 
concepts as the cosmos, the world, and nature (Copan et al. 2004; Bolonkin 2011). The universe is defined as 
all of space and time and their contents (Zeilik & Gregory 1998), including all forms of matter and energy, 
and the laws that influence them. Additionally, it often means "the totality of existence", or everything that 
exists, everything that has existed, and everything that will exist (Schreuder 2014). Nonetheless, it remains to 
answer the question: why does the universe look like what we observe? A philosophical explanation  is the 
anthropic principle: 
Observations of the universe must be compatible with the conscious and sapient life that observes it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)                                                                                   (b) 
 
Figure 1. Two strange loops: (a) I-my feelings, (b) mind-world. 
 
The anthropic principle was first articulated by Carter (1974), in order to address the anthropic selection 
of privileged spacetime locations in the universe and the values of the fundamental constants of physics. The 
principle has some similar arguments and many variants (Schopenhauer 2016; Barrow 1997). In Carter’s 
view, a weak variant states that our location in the universe is necessarily privileged to the extent of being 
compatible with our existence as observers, and a strong variant states that the universe (and hence the 
World Mind I My feelings 
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fundamental parameters on which it depends) must be such as to admit the creation of observers within it at 
some stage. 
It seems that the strong anthropic principle praraphrases Descartes, cogito ergo mundus talis est. This 
strong principle explains why the universe looks like our observation with a strange loop. What is a strange 
loop? It is a hierarchy of levels, each of which is linked to at least one other by some type of relationship 
(Barrow 1988; Penrose 1989; Hofstadter 1999; Hofstadter 2013). It may involve self-reference and paradox. 
Perhaps the best-known strangle loop is the “chicken or the egg” paradox. In processing self-conciousness, 
the mind perceives itself as the cause of certain feelings, leading to another strange loop that “I” am the 
source of my feelings (see Figure 1a). Moreover, using the idea of strange loop, we may have another 
version of the anthropic principle,  
       The universe that we find ourselves in is strongly constrained by the requirement that sentient beings 
like ourselves must actually be present to observe it. 
       Acorrdingly, the universe has something to do with our observation. The part that can be observed by 
humans is called the human world. Note that human observations require the mind to interact with the 
universe through sensors and effectors. The interactions may affect the way to perceive the external world, 
and even change it. This can result in a  mind-world strange loop (see Figure 1b). 
 
2.2. Animal worlds 
Perhaps the universe is the same in the mind of each human individual. However, there are so many animal 
species on the earth. Their observable parts should be different from the human world. The part that can be 
observed by an animal is called its world. A lot of scientific facts have shown that this anmimal world may 
not be the same as the human world. 
For instance, honeybees are able to compensate for the sun’s movement in their navigation. The 
compensation depends upon a memory of azimuth relative to the honeybees’ goal on the previous trip and an 
extrapolation of the sun’s current rate of azimuth movement (Gould 1980). When the sun is removed (e.g. 
obscured by a cloud, a landmark, or the horizon), the whole sun-centered system of bees is discarded in favor 
of a backup system  a separate navigational subroutine which is based on the patterns of polarized light 
generated in the sky by the scattering of sunlight (Dyer & Gould 1981). Since we humans cannot see 
polarized light directly, the honeybee’s world is different from the human world. 
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Frogs are not concerned with the stationary parts of the world around them. They will starve to death 
surrounded by stationary food, but can be easily fooled by a piece of dangled meat or any moving small 
object, and even leap to capture it if it has the size of an insect or worm and moves like one (Lettvin et al. 
1959). Of course, we can easily tell an insect or worm from other moving small objects. Hence, the frog’s 
world is different from the human world. 
Bats can make use of supersonic wave to navigate and locate. In addition to providing information about 
how far away a target is, a bat sonar can relay some remarkable details, for example, it conveys information 
about the relative velocity of a flying insect and its wing-beat, and the size of various features of the target as 
well as the azimuth and elevation of the target (Suga 1990). In contrast, we humans cannot hear ultrasoundl. 
Clearly, the bat’s world is different from the human world. 
Dogs are good at olfactory tracking with a sharp detection threshold for acetic acid that may be 108 times 
lower than human's threshold (Thesen et al. 1993). With superior olfaction, they can distinguish between 
more than two million smells, and even determine a difference in the concentration of scent in the air above 
two consecutive footprints. Clearly, we humans cannot do this at all. It goes without saying that the dog’s 
world is different from the human world. 
In addition, snakes can use infrared-sensitive receptors to "see" the radiated heat of warm-blooded prey. 
Elephants can use ears to hear infrasonic waves. Sharks can use ampullae of Lorenzini 1 to sense elecric 
fields. Without doubt, their worlds are also different from the human world. 
 
2.3. World’s relativity 
On the basis of scientific facts, it has been shown that the world an animal can observe generally differ from 
the human world. What about an intelligent machine? Can it observe a world that differs from humans’ and 
animals’? 
In artificial intelligence, an agent may refer to a human, an animal, or a machine. If the objective world 
denotes the universe-in-itself, the world-in-itself, or the ontological world, then the way an agent perceives it 
may have an effect on the part that the agent can observe. This part is defined as the subjective world of the 
agent. Accordingly, an agent’s subjective world may be greatly affected by the way it perceives the objective 
world. Therefore, the anthropic principle can be generalized to the Principle of World's Relativity: 
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The subjective world an intelligent agent can observe is strongly constrained by the way it perceives 
the objective world. 
Seemingly, the Principle of World’s Relativity requires that an intelligent agent should have a mind to 
observe its subjective world. But it does not deny mindless intelligence, which may exist in birds, lower 
animals, robots, and even plants. In ethology, birds often exhibit non-symbolic intelligence by carrying out a 
fixed action pattern (FAP), i.e., a hard-wired and instinctive behavioral sequence that is indivisible and runs 
to completion (Campbell 1996). A FAP (e.g., a mating dance or an egg rolling process) can be triggered by a 
sign stimulus, but it looks like an utterly mindless intelligent behavior. Additionally, both single-celled and 
multi-celled animals survive and reproduce very well without any nervous system at all, and “lower 
animals,” even insects, organize into thriving societies without any symbols, logic, or language, bee dancing 
and birdsong notwithstanding (Pollack 2006). Additionally, nouvelle AI aims to use inexact and incomplete 
knowledge to produce robots with intelligence levels similar to insects (Copeland 2015), it tries to get control 
actions adaptively and mindless intelligence (e.g. more complex behaviors like chasing a moving object) 
emerge organically from simple behaviors (e.g. like collision avoidance and moving toward a moving object) 
through interactions with the real world. Finally, plants can have an mindless ability to sense and respond to 
the environment to adjust their morphology, physiology, and phenotype accordingly (Trewavas 2005). For 
instance, the dodder (Trewavas 2002), a parasitic plant, assesses the exploitability of a new host within an 
hour or two of its initial touch contact. If insufficient, it continues searching for other, more profitable, hosts. 
Otherwise, it coils about the host with a particular number of coils (and eventually suckers) that depends on 
the assessed future return, and begins to take its host’s resources several days later. 
Since the Principle of World’s Relativity is fundamentally important to understand an agent’s subjective 
world, it should be selected as a first principle to establish a scientific theory of mind and consciousness. 
According to it, the subjective world only reflects a part of the objective world, like what a blind man feels 
about the nature of an elephant. The agent can construct its subjective world from the objective world, with 
its body bridging the two worlds and dissociating them at the same time. Moreover, the subjective world 
must be materially distinct from the objective world, because the former exists inside the body, with the later 
outside. The relationship between the two worlds are illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. The relationship of an agent’s subjective world with the objective world 
Because the subjective world is inside an agent’s body, it could not be identical to the objective world 
outside. Otherwise, some conflicts may turn up. For instance, people can observe a subjective house in their 
brains, but the subjective house may not have the same size as the objective house they are seeing, because 
the brains are too small to contain it. In a logical view, this means that the subjective world of an agent is 
something emergent from the objective world through the agent’s bodily interactions with it, such as 
perception and motion. Moreover, the subjective world should be virtual when compared with the reality of 
the objective world. It can be said that, the subjective world is a virtual reality of the objective world, 
whereas the reality may be relative to the agent, and vary with its kind. 
In Figure 2, the agent seems to have a mind, but this may not be the case. Conceptually, it is an 
autonomous entity that observes through sensors and acts upon an environment using actuators and directs its 
activity towards achieving goals. Theoretically, agents care often grouped into five classes: simple reflex 
agents, model-based reflex agents, goal-based agents, utility-based agents, and learning agents (Russell & 
Norvig 2011). For example, a thermostat is considered a simple agent. A complex agent may learn or use 
knowledge to achieve its goals. More generally, an agent is anything that can be viewed as perceiving its 
environment through sensors and acting upon that environment through actuators. It may be hardware, 
software, and their combination. In case of a mind, it can use the mind to monitor what happens and to 
improve its intelligence. Hence, there can be an additional class: minded agents (or conscious agents). 
Note that for an intelligent agent, the perception is merely a window to observe the objective world 
through sensors. Through it, the agent would never be able to get a complete view of the objective world. As 
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a special case, the agent cannot use one sensor to perceive the sensor itself. For example, we cannot use one 
of our eyes to see itself, unless by instruments. 
 
2.4. Difference between physical objects and physical symbols 
From the viewpoint of the PSSH, physical objects are not told from physical symbols. The world consists of 
physical objects and physical symbols. The symbols may include physical objects, simple symbols and 
complex symbols, even anything that we humans have and use every day of our lives (Newell 1980). Thus, 
the world an agent can observe is not subjective, which easily confuses the objective world. But according to 
the Principle of World's Relativity, the world an agent can observe is subjective. The subjective world is 
greatly dependent on the way it perceives the objective world. If two agents are equipped with different 
kinds of perceiving sensors, the subjective worlds they can observe may not be the same in general. They 
may even take an identical physical entity (or stimulus) as different objects. For example, grapes are people’s 
fruit but dogs’ poison 2. Therefore, physical objects are relative to different kinds of agents, and they may 
compose different subjective worlds. This means that physical object should be different from symbols. 
However, what exactly is the difference between them? 
In practice, a symbol must be implemented in a physical form. In this sense, it is a physical object, and 
can be called a physical symbol. But in theory it is merely an abstract entity that has no physical properties. 
Actually, a pure symbol, e.g., "0" and "1", cannot be said hard or soft. Moreover, from a symbol, nobody can 
get any real experience (or qualia) about the physical object that it refers to. Imagine what an "armadillo" is. 
Will you get an instance of it? The answer is “no”, unless you have a direct perception. The qualia of a real 
armadillo is beyond any symbolic description of it. By perception, an agent can observe physical objects 
through sensors to construct its subjective world. The subjective world is composed of the percepts (e.g. 
mental faces). Usually, these percepts are associated with certain physical objects (e.g. real faces) in the 
objective world. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the physical objects are always symbols. Only by 
definition can they be symbols. Without definition, they cannot be taken as symbols. Logically, any physical 
object can be defined as a symbol to designate some other physical objects, a kind of things, a mental event, 
even an abstract property, etc. Only as a symbol can it refer to some physical entity (or stimulus) other than 
itself. In reality, symbols are people-invented things. Essentially, they are a selective collection of physical 
objects that denotes something else by definition (or convention). Furthermore, they should have relatively 
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simple structures for easy use in representations, computations and communications. Additionally, a same 
symbol can be implemented in any physical forms, such as audio, visual, tactile, gesture, and even radio.  
Finally, it should be noted that, a physical symbol cannot refer to the physical object that implement it. 
Otherwise, the object is just itself, no longer a symbol. Therefore, a physical symbol system cannot use 
symbols to recursively represent all physical objects in the objective world, and it is not the sufficient means 
for general intelligent action. 
 
3. The Principle of Symbol’s Relativity 
Although reflexes play a role in growth, human intelligence largely starts with conscious experience about 
physical objects through perceiving sensors (e.g. eyes, ears, nose, tongue and body), leading to gradual 
acquisition of physical knowledge. From the viewpoint of genetic epistemology (Piaget 1972), people can 
further use physical symbols to develop and improve their conscious intelligence by inventing abstract 
logical-mathematical knowledge through actions, and by learning culture-specific social knowledge from 
other people. According to the Principle of World’s Relativity, intelligent machines can also have conscious 
experience about physical objects without physical symbols. But their physical objects may be different from 
those in the human world. Since the physical symbols are a selective collection of physical objects that 
denotes something else, the machines will probably be unable to use the same physical forms of human 
language at all. The central issue of this section is: what physical forms of language they can use to develop 
and improve their conscious intelligence based on physical knowledge. First, the symbol grounding problem 
is considered on symbolic meaning. Second, the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity is derived from life 
experience. Third, the principle is applied to analyze limits on symbolic AI. Last, it is combined with the 
Principle of World’s Relativity to analyze limits on computational intelligence and computationalism. 
 
3.1. Symbol grounding problem 
Generally, the meaning of a symbol is its referent, i.e. the thing that it refers to. A compound of symbols may 
have an idiomatic referent, which is not always the sum total of the meanings of the symbols. However, a 
referent could be distinguished from the meaning. For example, Abraham Lincoln and the sixteenth 
President of the United States both have the same referent, but not the same meaning. 
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The problem of how symbols get their meanings involves the symbol grounding problem (Harnad 1990). 
The mediation of the mind would play a critical role in the intentional connection between symbols and any 
intended referents. The meaning of a symbol on a page is ungrounded. In contrast, the symbols one does 
understand are grounded in his head. The brain would make them become meaningful thoughts by the mind. 
To avoid infinite regression, a symbol grounding process is suggested to require two properties (Harnad 
1990; Cangelosi & Harnad 2001): 1) capacity to pick referents, and 2) consciousness. Obviously, a symbol 
system alone cannot have the body-dependent capacity of picking out referents, except the part of pure 
computation. To be grounded, it would have to be augmented with non-symbolic sensorimotor capacities to 
interact with the objective world. In other words, it should be an embodied agent. For this agent, symbolic 
meaning could be ultimately grounded in its capacity to detect, categorize, identify, and act upon the things 
that symbols and strings refer to. Since an unconscious robot zombie could be possible to pass the Turing test 
indistinguishably from us for a lifetime, groundedness should not be a sufficient condition for meaning. Thus, 
consciousness is required as a secondary property. In the Chinese room argument, even Searle has appealed 
to consciousness when pointing out that the Chinese symbols would be meaningless to him. Otherwise, 
meaning could be argued to go on in his head, but simply not being conscious of by himself. 
Surely, meaning needs grounding. But grounding is not meaning. It is an input-output performance 
function related to extenal objects, sensory organs, internal symbols, mental states, and intentional actions. 
One may use  sensory organs to perceive the obejctive world, mental states to represent extenal objects, 
internal symbols to formulate thoughts, and responding effectors to execute intentional actions.  
 
3.2. Symbol’s relativity 
Commonly, symbols are used to express meanings in a context of groundedness and consciousness. 
Moreover, a system of symbols can make up a language. Language is a basic tool for thinking and 
communication in human society. In different countries, people generally speak different languages. There 
are about 50007000 languages spoken all over the world, 90% of them used by less than 100000 people. As 
estimated by UNESCO (The United Nations’ Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), the most 
widely spoken languages are: Mandarin Chinese, English, Spanish, Hindi, Arabic, Bengali, Russian, 
Portuguese, Japanese, German and French. In practice, a language usually takes forms of speech and text, but 
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it can also be encoded into whistle, sign, braille, or gesture. This leads to an interesting question, can 
machines think in language of other forms, e.g. radio? 
      In daily life, people are accustomed to thinking and communication in sound language. To all appearance, 
a Chinese can think in Chinese, an American can think in English, a Spanish can think in Spanish, and so on. 
From the viewpoint of life experience, all these spoken forms of language, even including any other forms 
such as whistle, sign, braille and gesture, should be equivalent for thinking and communication. This self-
evident point can generalize to an important principle, termed the Principle of Language’s Relativity (Li 
2018), the Principle of Symbolic Relativity” (Li 2005) or the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity. The principle 
may be described as follows, 
All admissible forms of language are equivalent for an intelligent system to think about the world. 
In the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity, an admissible form means that the system can use it for thinking, 
i.e. the formulation of thoughts about the world. Also, the principle can be stated in other words, 
All admissible forms of language are equivalent with respect to the formulation of thoughts about the 
world. 
Note that it is named with inspiration from the principle of relativity in physics 3, namely, 
All admissible frames of reference are equivalent with respect to the formulation of the fundamental 
laws of physics. 
That is, physic laws are the same in all reference frames - inertial or non-inertial. By analogy, a language 
can be regarded as a frame of reference to express information (e.g. thoughts and ideas). In this sense, all 
forms of language, such as speech, text, whistle, sign, braille and gesture, can be readily understood to have 
equivalence in expression of the same information. Note that different forms of language may not be as 
easily implemented as each other (e.g., it is easier to write “US” than “United States“). Actually, they are not 
equivalent in physical implementation. But they are theoretically equivalent to produce the function of 
information expression. According to the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity, a language (or a symbol system) 
is independent of its physical forms to express information from perception. No matter what forms it is 
physically implemented, all the forms are equivalent to formulate thoughts, despite a wide range of 
difficulties. Therefore, the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity can also be stated as follows, 
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An intelligent agent can use any physical symbol system to express what it observes in its subjective world. 
     Obviously, this statement is somewhat like the PSSH. The difference between them lies in that it tells 
physical symbols from physical objects, whereas the PSSH takes physical objects as physical symbols. In 
theory, a symbol is an abstract entity, but in practice it must be implemented in some physical form. This 
implemented symbol is called a physical symbol, which can be generally defined below. 
        A physical symbol is a kind of behavior that an intelligent agent can produce, and something that it 
can make or choose, to define for referring to anything other than itself. 
Based on the above definition, the physical symbol may also be taken as a physical object for the agent 
itself and others to perceive again and evoke subsequent action. However, in this case the physical object 
would have a different meaning than its symbolic referent. For example, a signature of name means more 
than the name itself. Additionally, in communication of ideas, the physical symbol must be recognized by 
other agents to designate the same thing. 
In the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity, the subjective world is constructed from an agent’s perception 
of the objective world, where the two worlds can be bridged by the Principle of World’s Relativity. Because 
of independence and compatibility, the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity should also be selected as a first 
principle. Like the Principle of World’s Relativity, it is fundamentally important to establish a scientific 
theory of mind and consciousness (or intelligence more broadly). 
According to the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity, animals may produce a symbolic intelligence of 
communication in a different language from people. For example, it is widely accepted that honey bees can 
use a dance language to encode the distance and direction of the food. After gaining the information from the 
dance performed by a forager, recruits can fly to find the food (Frisch 1967; Gould 1975a; 1975b).  The 
dance language is an explanation of how foragers recruit other workers, perhaps with some role of odor 
(Munz 2005). This language is extremely simple when compared with human language. One may argue that 
the dance is a kind of behavioral intelligence, rather than a symbolic intelligence. However, according to the 
definition of physical symbols, it can also be conceived of as a symbol in the case expressing information 
about the food. In this sense, it is certainly a kind of symbolic intelligence. 
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3.3. Limits on symbolic AI 
Many aspects of intelligence can be achieved by the manipulation of symbols. This kind of intelligence is 
called symbolic intelligence. Symbolic AI is the term for the collection of all AI methods using high-level 
symbolic representations of problems, logic and search. The Turing test is a satisfactory operational 
definition of symbolic intelligence (Turing 1950): a computer passes the test if a human interrogator, after 
posing some written questions, cannot tell whether the written responses come from a person or from a 
computer (Russell & Norvig, 2011).  The approach of symbolic AI is also named GOFAI (Good Old-
Fashioned Artificial Intelligence) (Haugeland 1985), e.g. expert systems with a network of production rules. 
Based on the PSSH, a physical symbol system can produce any intelligent action. However, can it always 
catch the exact meaning of a symbol that refers to a physical object? 
According to the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity, the answer will be “no”, because a physical symbol 
system can only manipulate pure symbols and their combinations. It may have a symbolic world built from 
keyboard inputs, but cannot construct a subjective world from perception of the objective world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Armadillo 
 
Traditionally, a physical symbol system may be defined as a selective collection of symbols with 
manipulations on them. In such a system, symbols can be manipulated to produce combinations of symbols, 
compound symbols, or other new symbols. But elementary symbols have to be defined by people (or other 
observers) for referring to physical objects. Without observes’ explanation, the system can neither relate the 
elementary symbols to their corresponding physical objects, nor get their exact meaning, for lack of 
homologous sensors to perceive the objective world. In fact, the subjective experience of physical objects is 
beyond the expressive capability of symbols. For example, nobody knows what exactly an “armadillo” is, 
before directly perceiving an instance of it (see Figure 3). As a physical object, the image of an “armadillo” 
is taken as a symbol by the PSSH. But the image is different from the word “armadillo”. A human being can 
understand the image at once, but not the word. Without seeing the image, even it will be impossible for a 
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human to understand the word “armadillo” exactly, let alone for a physical symbol system. Hence, the PSSH 
cannot solve the symbol grounding problem substantially. In other words, a physical symbol system cannot 
get any conscious experience (e.g. qualia) from the objective world, thus it is not the sufficient condition for 
general intelligent action. 
 
3.4. Limits on computational intelligence and computationalism 
Human intelligence is non-symbolic in general. Although this non-symbolic intelligence may be non-
computational, current AI can be almost considered symbolic or computational. Computational intelligence 
is the study of the design of intelligent agents (Poole et al. 1998). It aims to address complex real-world 
problems with a set of nature-inspired computational methodologies and approaches (Siddique, 2013), and 
tries to produce the learnability of a computer from data or experimental observation, where there might be 
too complex processes with some uncertainties for mathematical reasoning. 
Compared with symbolic AI, computational intelligence is more concerned with the problem of how to 
produce AI with inexact and incomplete knowledge instead of strict description in formal symbols. It is a 
useful approach in computational theory of mind (CTM) 8, or computationalism (Scheutz 2003). As a 
position of strong AI (Searle 1980), the CTM is the philosophical position that human minds are computer 
programs in essence, or more concretely that  the appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs 
and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds (Searle 1999). 
More generally, the CTM is a family of views holding that the human mind is an information processing 
system and that cognition and consciousness are a form of computation. It entails the computational theory 
of cognition (CTC), which provides an explanatory framework of understanding neural networks. According 
to the CTC, neural activity is computational, and neural computations explain cognition (Piccinini & Bahar 
2013), but it leaves open the possibility that phenomenal consciousness could be non-computational (Harnad 
1994). However, the CTM asserts that not only cognition, but also phenomenal consciousness (or qualia), are 
computational. According to the CTM, the mind is not simply analogous to a computer program, but literally 
a computational system that is physically implemented by neural activity in the brain (Horst 2005). If neural 
activity is a kind of computation, then the mind, generated by it, should be able to implement in silicon chips, 
or artificial neural networks. This is a general point of the CTM. 
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     The CTM has been argued against by Searle's Chinese room and Mary’s room. Searle (1980) argues that 
computers cannot be said to have intentionality and understanding, and they are insufficient for the study of 
the human mind. Mary’s room is a thought experiment also known as Mary the super-scientist (Jackson 
1982). As a brilliant scientist, Mary knows everything about the science of color perception (e.g. brain states 
and physical properties), but has never experienced color in a black and white room. The question is: once 
she experiences color, does she learn anything new? The answer “yes” shows that she can possibly discover 
some non-physical knowledge only through conscious experience (or qualia). Thus, qualia of seeing color 
(e.g. red, green and blue) are something nonphysical beyond the interpretability of neural activity. In other 
words, the computation of neural activity does not explain the human mind wholly. 
 
Figure 4. Human perceptions in computational and non-computational views. 
According to the Principle of World’s Relativity, the human mind can have phenomenal consciousness in 
non-computational ways. Moreover, the principle claims that phenomena are subjective, and may vary with 
different kinds of intelligent agents, which can observe the subjective worlds composed of physical objects. 
The physical objects are strongly constrained by the agent’s perception of the objective world. According to 
the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity, a selective collection of them can be defined as symbols to represent 
any other physical objects. Through computation of these symbols, the agent would be able to behave 
intelligently in activities of achieving goals. However, physical objects are different from physical symbols. 
Generally, one cannot catch the exact meaning of a symbol (e.g. “armadillo”). Hence, the super-scientist 
Mary cannot have a real experience of color based on the science of color perception, unless having chances 
to seeing color directly. In addition, as a subjective experience of physical objects, qualia may not be 
computational at all. For example, human perception sometimes requires non-computational processing. 
That is to say, perception is not always computation. In fact, computation is a transforming process from 
input to output, theoretically it produces the same output for the same input in general. However, perception 
is not just a signal-to-symbol transformation. As Figure 4 shows, by seeing people normally recognize a real 
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cockroach as symbol "cockroach" that is uneatable in computational view, but in hungry state they may 
alternatively take it as "food" in non-computational view. No doubt, hungriness is a desire to eat, involving 
digestion of food. To all appearances, digestion is not a computational process, but a chemical process that 
cannot be sufficiently understood in the computational metaphor. 
Furthermore, taste of sugar requires non-computational physical/chemical processing that follows the 
natural laws, beyond computational simulations. From the point of TCR’s view, even if computational 
models could help intelligent agents to construct their subjective worlds from the objective world through 
physical interactions, the subjective worlds would not be absolutely computational in themselves. Actually, 
they should always have pertinence to perceiving sensors of the agents and matter distributions in the 
environments. In addition, the results of computational models have to be explained and understood by 
humans or some other kinds of agents in their subjective worlds. Therefore, it is impossible to build a unified 
computational model of perception for all kinds of intelligent agents. This implies that, intelligence, at least 
the part of conscious experience, may not be a computer program.  
 
4. Thought Experiments 
The mind-body problem is not only the central issue of philosophy, but also of intelligence science arguably. 
A final solution to the problem requires a new paradigm, especially the Theory of Cognitive Relativity, 
which at least includes two first principles: the Principle of World’s Relativity and the Principle of Symbol’s 
Relativity. To demonstrate their importance and necessity for solving the mind-body problem, in this section 
the two first principles are exploited to analyze four thought experiments that focus primarily on the theme of 
mind, consciousness and intelligence. Respectively, these thought experiments are: 1) brains in a vat, 2) 
removal of perceptions, 3) robonauts in space exploration; 4) society of artificial mind. 
 
4.1. Brains in a vat 
In philosophy, the brain in a vat (or brain in a jar) is a well-known thought experiment 4, which raises issues 
about the mind/world relationship, especially the classical problem of skepticism with respect to the external 
world in a modern way. This experiment is intended to draw out certain features of human conceptions of 
knowledge, reality, truth, mind, consciousness and meaning. It outlines a scenario in which a person’s brain 
might be removed from the body and suspended in a vat of life-sustaining liquid. Meanwhile, the nerve 
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endings have been connected by wires to a supercomputer (see Figure 5). The problem is, if the 
supercomputer were so clever to provide the brain with electrical impulses identical to those it normally 
receives through the nerve endings, would it get the same view of reality as an embodied brain? In other 
words, without being related to objects or events in the real world, would the disembodied brain continue to 
have perfectly normal conscious experiences?  For example, the illusion of people, grass, cats, dogs, apples, 
flowers, trees, houses, the sky, etc. 
 
 
Figure 5. A disembodied brain with the nerve endings connected to a supercomputer 4.  
 
Instead of just one brain, it could be imagined that all human (or sentient) beings are brains in a vat. 
Moreover, the supercomputer can give them all a collective hallucination, rather than a number of separate 
unrelated hallucinations. In this case, would the disembodied brains have the consciousness that is perfectly 
consistent with everything they have experienced? 
      From the viewpoint of the identical impulses, it seems that the disembodied and embodied brains would 
have a totally consistent view about their external worlds. However, according to the Principle of World’s 
Relativity, they would not because of different perceiving sensors. Notably, a disembodied brain lacks the 
connections from the body to it, whereas an embodied brain receives the stimuli from the sensors found in 
the body. They are neither neuroanatomically nor neurophysiologically similar in their perceptual structures 
(Heylighen & Apostel 2012). Therefore, the disembodied brain perceives the objective world in a different 
way from the embodied brain. Accordingly, their subjective worlds would not be the same completely. At 
least, the disembodied brains cannot think or say anything about where exactly they are. Otherwise, this will 
lead to some kind of self-refuting arguments, for example, “they are brains in a vat,” or “we are brains in a 
vat” 5. In addition, the disembodied brains cannot think or say anything about their bodies. Otherwise, this 
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will result in another kind of self-refuting arguments, for example, “they all have bodies,” or “we all have 
bodies”. Note that neither can the embodied brains with each in a scull be in a vat, nor can the disembodied 
brains have any bodies. Therefore, the disembodied and embodied brains must have something inconsistent 
with their conscious experiences. 
 
4.2. Removal of perceptions 
In neuroscience, consciousness is hypothetically generated by the interoperation of various parts of the brain, 
called the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). The NCC constitute the minimal set of neuronal events 
and mechanisms sufficient for a specific conscious percept (Koch 2004). Some proponents believe that this 
NCC interoperation can possibly be emulated by computer systems or cognitive robotics. 
 
Figure 6. The Necker cube and Rubin vase. 
       However, according to the Principle of World’s Relativity, consciousness is closely related to perception. 
However, what exactly is their relationship? Clearly, the brain uses perception to understand the environment 
by interpretation of sensory signals that go through the nervous system. These signals, e.g. light, pressure 
waves and odor molecules, are related to different types of perception, including vision, hearing, smell, taste, 
touch, etc. Apart from the passive receipt of the signals, the perception is also shaped by the recipient’s 
learning, memory, expectation, and attention. For instance, the Necker cube and Rubin vase can be 
ambiguously perceived in more than one way (see Figure 6). This shows that a perceptual system can 
actively attempt to make sense of its input. 
     How sensory information influences perception is a vital issue in psychology, science, and philosophy. 
Even though the information is typically incomplete and rapidly varying, the perceptual systems enable the 
brain to perceive a stable world around. Obviously, perception is strongly correlated to consciousness. Locke 
defined consciousness as “the perception of what passes in a man’s own mind” 6. It seems that consciousness 
must be based on perception. But what is the minimum requirement of perception for emergence of 
consciousness? The problem leads to an interesting thought experiment, called “removal of perceptions”. 
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Figure 7. An embodied brain with eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and limbs. 
     Generally, an embodied brain perceives the environment with sensory organs: eyes, ears, nose, tongue 
and limbs (see Figure 7). These organs are essential to produce vision, hearing, smell, taste and touch. 
However, are they all the basic requirements for consciousness? What would happen if some of them were 
removed? Although all of them play a role in normal consciousness, arguably none of them is indispensable 
for emergence of consciousness. In reality, a blind person can have consciousness without vision, and a deaf 
person can have consciousness without hearing. Moreover, a person can also have consciousness after 
removing other perceptions: smell, taste, touch, etc. Even with all these common perceptions removed, one 
can still have consciousness in imagination and dream! 
     What exactly is the relationship between perception and consciousness? According to the Principle of 
World’s Relativity, an intelligent agent should have a subjective world for consciousness. Theoretically, it 
may observe a multisource subjective world in perceiving the objective world with diverse sensors. 
Presumably, the simplest subjective world would be at least composed of existence and non-existence about 
something from one source. Therefore, consciousness needs a minimum requirement of perception to build 
such a bare-bones subjective world of existence and non-existence. Many types of perception can 
collectively result in more complex consciousness. A removal of some types will make the consciousness 
simpler. However, no special perception is indispensable for consciousness. Consciousness can emerge 
without vision, hearing, smell, taste, or touch. But any type of perception may give rise to consciousness, 
regardless of what type. 
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4.3. Robonauts in space exploration 
With the impressive progress of deep learning (LeCun et al. 2015), esp. the success of AlphaGo (Silver et al. 
2016), the interest in building machines that learn and think like people has been excited and renewed again 
(Lake et al. 2017), despite great challenges to perform a variety of tasks as rapidly and flexibly as people do. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Two robonauts are talking about the earth in a Morse-code radio language on the moon. One 
says “THE EARTH IS OUR HOME”, the other “IT IS TRULY BEAUTIFUL”. This is a potential 
application of the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity to artificial intelligence in the future. 
 
What does it mean for a machine to learn and think like a person? Lake et al. (2017) argued that this 
machine should build causal models of the world, ground learning in intuitive theories of physics and 
psychology, and harness compositionality and learning-to-learn. They claimed that these key ideas of core 
ingredients would play an active and important role in producing human-like learning and thought. 
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Undoubtedly, their claim is attractive for the ultimate dream of implementing machines with human-level 
general intelligence. However, the claim says little about a person’s ability to communicate and think in 
natural language, which is clearly vital for human intelligence (Mikolov  et al. 2018). 
It goes without saying that language is an essential ability for human intelligence, e.g. thinking and 
communication. But is it necessary for intelligent machines to think and communicate in human language? 
Can they think and communicate in a physical language other than people have ever used? (Li 2018) 
Moreover, in space exploration of no air, how should a capacity of language be developed for two robot 
astronauts to talk each other (see Figure 8). 
According to the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity, language is independent of modality. This would give 
practical guidance to engineering future generations of intelligent agents. For example, principally robots can 
think in radio language. These robots would be tremendously useful in space exploration, where for lack of 
air, radio language is much more convenient for them to talk each rather than sound language. Since no 
person has an inborn ability to receive and send radio waves, the radio form of language is not admissible for 
humans. Thus, radio language is a novel and creative idea for robots to think about the world, although radio 
is certainly very ordinary for information transmission and remote control. Clearly, thinking in radio 
language (radio thinking), is a people-different way to implement AI. One may argue that, even without 
language, artificial intelligence could equal or even beat human intelligence in performing such tasks as 
object recognition (He 2016), video games (Mnih et al. 2015) and board games (Silver et al. 2016). But 
autonomous robonauts would be more practical on the moon or the other planets if they can use radio 
language to think, communicate and collaborate. Although Kirobo is the world’s first talking robot sent into 
space 7, it is tasked to be a companion, not an intelligent explorer. With sound language, Kirobo can talk only 
inside the spacecraft. A solution to this problem would be the use of radio language, by which robonauts 
could talk outside. Despite that a radio language can be a translation of any human language, in theory it can 
also be a totally different language with all symbols and words defined arbitrarily and even randomly. 
 
4.4. Society of artificial mind 
It is well-known that Minsky (1986) published a book titled “The Society of Mind”. In his philosophy, a core 
tenet on the conceptual level is that “minds are what brains do”. Moreover, the human mind and any other 
naturally evolved cognitive systems can be viewed as a vast society of individually simple processes known 
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as agents. Although these processes are not minds, they are fundamental to build minds. Hence, a mind is a 
society of agents, not the consequence of some basic principle or some simple formal system.  
Presently, an agent may refer to a human, an animal, or a machine. Thus, it can be an intelligent machine 
with artificial mind. A number of minded agents of the same kind would be able to form a society of 
artificial mind. According to the Theory of Cognitive Relativity, these agents may have a subjective world 
different from the human world. The question is, what would happen in their society of artificial mind? 
The thought experiment “society of artificial mind” can be envisioned in a diversity of cases. For 
example, in the case that the minded agents could see only ultraviolet, what would happen in their society of 
artificial mind? In human visual perception, color can be categorized into red, orange, yellow, green, blue, 
purple, etc. Moreover, these categories are associated with physical objects through the wavelength of the 
light that is reflected on them. The color of a physical object depends on both the physics of the object in its 
environment and the characteristics of the perceiving eye and brain. However, in the agents’ perception, how 
could ultraviolet produce color categories in their society of artificial mind?  A thoughtful consideration on 
this question would probably result in a relative science of ultraviolet color to the characteristics of the 
agent’s perceiving eye and “brain”, although the Theory of Cognitive Relativity still requires some additional 
first principles to answer what the agent’s “brain” should be. 
Another interesting case is that if the minded agents (e.g. aliens) could perceiving nothing in the human 
world. The question is, with what different kinds of sensors and effectors would they become sufficiently 
intelligent to establish a scientific theory (e.g. physics) to grasp the nature of the objective world in their 
society of artificial mind? A deep analysis on this question would probably result in a relative epistemology 
to the characteristics of the agents’ perceiving sensors and responding effectors, which might explain the 
nature of knowledge relatively, and answer whether knowledge is possible at all. 
 
5. Insights for True AI 
Recently, AI techniques have experienced a resurgence with advances of deep learning, computer power, and 
large amount of data. But all AI-related achievements belong to weak AI, far away from strong AI. Although 
strong AI originally refers to computational theory of mind 8, at present it more likely refers to true AI, i.e. 
artificial general intelligence (AGI) or artificial consciousness (AC).   
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In the era after deep learning, it is an urgent desire to realize true AI. The fundamental problem of true AI 
is whether it can be possible to use abiotic materials to achieve a machine with human mind. Traditionally, 
even until now, almost all AI researches are preoccupied with simulating the human mind  the zenith of 
natural intelligence as far as is known. Moreover, these researches are based on the belief that AI systems 
should understand the objective world in the same way as people do. Thus, discovering the neural basis of 
mind is arguably regarded as the greatest challenge in cognitive neuroscience (Tenenbaum et al. 2011). The 
challenge strives to explain the brain's workings with a computational model in theory and simulation 
(Eliasmith et al. 2012; Gerstner et al. 2012). However, according to the Chinese room argument, the 
computational model cannot explain the human mind satisfactorily, meaning that it is not a sufficient 
approach to true AI.  
To realize true AI in a different way, in this section the Theory of Cognitive Relativity, or TCR, is 
exploited to extract insights for artificial general intelligence or artificial consciousness respectively. 
 
5.1. Artificial General Intelligence 
Artificial general intelligence (Goertzel & Pennachin 2007), is the intelligence of a hypothetical machine that 
could perform at least the full range of human cognitive abilities. Unlike the breakthrough of weak AI, the 
AGI makes little progress in the resurgence of AI with deep learning. In early research, many AI pioneers 
thought that the AGI would possibly exist within just a few decades, to do any work a man can do. Their 
predictions were the inspiration for character HAL 9000, who was an envisioned embodiment of the AGI. 
However, the difficulty of making HAL 9000 had been grossly underestimated. It became obvious in the 
1970s, increasing criticism of the AGI and pressure to produce useful “applied AI” (i.e. weak AI). In the 
1980s, interest in the AGI was revived by Japan's Fifth Generation Computer Project. But the goals of this 
project were never fulfilled, leading to collapse of confidence in the AGI. By the 1990s, AGI gained a 
reputation of vain promises and became a topic that would be mentioned reluctantly.  
There are a lot of possible reasons for the difficulty of AGI. The first is that computers lack a sufficient 
scope of memory or processing power. The second is that the level of its relevant complexity may also limit 
its implementation. The third is the conceptual framework, which should be modified to provide a stronger 
base for the quest of AGI. Other reasons involve the lack of a complete understanding of human behaviors as 
well as the need to fully understand the human brain through psychology and neurophysiology.  
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From the point of TCR’s view, the AGI has an unrealistic goal to achieve the human-level AI on a 
computer platform. According to the TCR, if an intelligent agent perceives the objective world through 
different kinds of sensors from humans, then it may observe a different subjective world. Since the human 
subjective world depends strongly on the human brain and body, most of this subjective world is beyond 
what a computer can do. Although the computer could produce artificial intelligence that are inspired from 
the human brain, it would not have a human subjective world because of no human body. Therefore, the AGI 
should not set its goal to achieve the human-level AI on computers. Basically speaking, it requires a 
revolutionary conceptual framework for intelligent agents that are based on the perceiving sensors, the 
communicating capabilities, and the executing actuators. On the other hand, probably there will be no such 
AGI that can perform the best in all respects. In fact, people are not always the most intelligent among 
biological creatures. Without using tools, people cannot beat owls in catching mice. Moreover, people can 
neither fly as freely as birds, nor swim as smartly as dolphins. Meanwhile, no matter how to teach owls, birds 
and dolphins, they will never catch the genuine meanings of differential equations, quantum mechanics and 
Turing Machines in the way of human understanding. 
From the point of the TCR’s view, the subjective world is very important for an intelligent to achieve the 
goals of AGI, but it may not be necessary for a computer to produce weak AI. Without it, a computer 
program (e.g. AlphaGo) could also exhibit intelligence and even superintelligence in a limited task specific 
field. However, based on the Chinese room argument (Searle 1980), no matter how intelligently or human-
like a program may make a computer behave, it cannot give the computer a “mind”, “understanding” or 
“consciousness”, which is a requirement of the AGI. Therefore, in order to have a mind, the AGI should be 
developed on physical robots that can interact with the objective world through perceiving sensors and 
responding effectors. Although their subjective worlds could be generally different from the human world, 
they would also have possibilities to achieve a human-different kind of AGI. A vital issue of TCR would be 
the problem of how to realize such a kind of AGI without emulating the human brain and body, in particular 
that it could ultimately establish a scientific theory (e.g. physics) to grasp the nature of the objective world in 
a different way as people do. 
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5.2. Artificial Consciousness 
Artificial consciousness is a hypothetical machine that possesses awareness of external objects, ideas and/or 
self-awareness. Traditionally, it aims to synthesize human consciousness in an engineered artefact such as 
computer, but it has not yet been implemented at all in any AI systems. Whether machines may ever be 
conscious is a controversial question (Dehaene et al. 2017).  In order to implement artificial consciousness, 
there would be many necessary aspects for consideration, such as awareness, memory, learning, anticipation, 
and subjective experience. However, all these aspects are very difficult to define exactly. Moreover, it is still 
not easy to draw a clear-cut distinction between conscious and unconscious mental processes. Although the 
quantity of integrated information is conceived as a theoretic measure that reflects how much consciousness 
there is (Tonni et al. 2016), mere information-theoretic quantities may not suffice to define consciousness, 
because it can hypothetically result from specific types of information-processing computations (Dehaene et 
al. 2017).  
Undoubtedly, the conscious mind is the center of human intelligence. But what exactly is consciousness? 
In general, it is the state or quality of awareness or of being aware of an external object or something within 
oneself (Gulick 2004). Human consciousness has been defined as: sentience, awareness, subjectivity, qualia, 
the ability to experience or to feel, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood, and the executive control system 
of the mind (Farthing 1992). Animal consciousness can be defined similarly with a lot of evidence (Griffin 
2001), it poses the problem of other minds because non-human animals cannot use human language to tell 
about their subjective experience, such as tastings, seeings, hearings, pains, tickles, itches, and streams of 
thought. Since subjective experience could be the essence of consciousness, the existence of animal 
consciousness would never rigorously be known. 
From the point of TCR’s view, animals may not have the same consciousness as humans’ because they 
generally perceive the objective world in different ways. Accordingly, intelligent machines may also have 
artificial consciousness that is different from humans’ and animals’. Hence, there will be no such universal 
consciousness that can be defined for all different kinds of intelligent agents. Furthermore, since subjective 
experience may vary with different types of intelligent agents, a consciousness can only be realized in a 
special kind of physical systems because some properties of it depend necessarily on physical constitution. 
Although biological consciousness is physically realized by the hardware of brain and body, this hardware 
cannot be used to achieve artificial consciousness. Because a computer is not an embodied brain, even if 
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some day it had an artificial consciousness, the consciousness would be different from those that humans and 
animals have in their brains. According to the TCR, artificial consciousness requires a theory that can be 
independent of the biological brain, just as artificial flight requires aerodynamics. Note that aerodynamics is 
a theory independent of the biological bird. That is, it can be described without biological terms. The 
realization of artificial consciousness should be based particularly on a subjective world built from 
observations of the objective world. Since the subjective world generally differs from the human world and 
the animal worlds, this realization is indeed a brain-different approach to true AI, rather than the brain-like 
intelligence. 
From the point of the TCR’s view, intelligent machines can have many different levels of artificial 
consciousness, like biological consciousness. At what level would be related to their ways of perceiving the 
objective world. The top level might be the AGI. But it is insufficient to realize artificial consciousness 
merely in computational models. In fact, according to genetic epistemology (Piaget 1972), an agent’s 
conscious intelligence arises from its physical interactions between the subjective world and the objective 
world. People’s logical-mathematical knowledge must be constructed on the basis of physical knowledge. 
Without physical interactions, even people cannot determine the correctness of their thoughts and 
computations totally, for example, which geometry is correct, Euclidean or non-Euclidean, in their own 
reality, although they are so mathematically thoughtful to invent many axiomatic systems for geometries. 
Therefore, intelligent machines require physical interactions to develop true AI, not only for catching the 
exact meanings but also for determining the real correctness of their thoughts and computations. 
 
6. TCR Creed for Consciousness Studies 
The profound and far-reaching implication of TCR lies in that it can help people get rid of the limitations of 
their own perceptual abilities and go beyond a higher level to understand the relationship between the 
subjective world and the objective world. Moreover, it may play a practical role of guidance in realization of 
true AI. Despite that the TCR requires some additional first principles to completion, a TCR creed has been 
presented (Li 2005) and extended for consciousness studies in area divisions, neuroscientific experiments, 
theoretical explanations, engineering realizations, etc. The creed mainly includes the following opinions: 
1) The study of consciousness should be divided into three directions: human consciousness, animal 
consciousness, and machine consciousness. Notably, these three directions need to adopt different 
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methods. Neither impose human consciousness readily on animals, nor expect too much that machines 
will have the same consciousness as humans. Since humans, animals and machines may perceive the 
objective world in different ways, they can have different subjective worlds in their consciousness, 
according to the TCR. 
2) For human consciousness, the study should focus on the neural mechanisms of how consciousness 
disorders (e.g. prosopagnosia and schizophrenia) arise and the methods to treat these disorders, because 
of limitations on normal people. Don’t try hard to build a so-called brain model to explain human 
consciousness in a computational way. Actually, the best explanation of human consciousness is the 
human brain itself, not its model. To duplicate the performance of the human brain largely, such a model 
can be extremely complex, and will be hard, or even impossible for us to understand (Churchland & 
Sejnowski 1988). Even if the model could have a consciousness, perhaps the consciousness would not 
be the human consciousness at all. In fact, it is more likely to simulate the brain activities of a lower 
animal, rather than any consciousness. 
3) For animal consciousness, the study should focus on how the worlds observed by animals differ from 
the human world and on how they communicate with each other, and then on how their different kinds 
of conscious intelligence are produced by the organs, nuclei, and functional areas of the nervous systems. 
Don’t be too enthusiastic in search for the neural counterparts of the outside world or the neural 
correlates of consciousness (i.e. NCC) for a specific conscious percept (Koch 2004). On the one hand, it 
could be very hard to confirm the existence of these counterparts or the NCC due to their widely (even 
wholly) distributed representations. On the other hand, in case of existence they still mean almost 
nothing to different kinds of individuals, and they may have cerebral positions and firing patterns that 
vary with different experiences of individuals of the same kind. 
4) The most difficult problem of consciousness is to explain how physical processes in the brain give rise 
to subjective experience. It is also called the hard problem (Chalmers 1995a), which constitutes a real 
conundrum of mind. This problem seems to defy the possibility of a scientific explanation (Chalmers 
1995b). According to the Principle of World’s Relativity, subjective experience depends greatly on 
perception. The hard problem may vary with different kinds of conscious agents. Therefore, it cannot be 
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completely solved by the brain mechanisms. At least, the hard problem of conscious machines needs to 
be answered in a different way they perceive the objective world. 
5) The most important thing for solving the problem of consciousness is to create intelligent machines with 
artificial consciousness, instead to discover the neural mechanisms of biological consciousness. 
Although we are still not clear the neural mechanisms of how birds fly, the fact that we can make 
airplanes means we have already mastered the secrets of flight. Likewise, when we can make conscious 
machines, it will also mean that we have revealed the secrets of consciousness. Therefore, it can be 
anticipated that conscious machines will be created before the neural mechanisms of consciousness are 
revealed, just like the creation of flying machines prior to the neural mechanisms of biological flights. 
6) In the development of true AI, it is not a choice of must to employ the brain-like approach (Sendhoff et 
al. 2009). According to the TCR, the subjective world of a non-human animal is generally different from 
humans’, and that of a machine can be more different from humans’. Hence, true AI could be realized in 
a brain-different way. This implies that the brain-like intelligence would not be necessary to achieve the 
goal of true AI, particularly in the present age with insurmountable technological obstacles. For example, 
it would be a great obstacle to realize a brain-like state of pain by emulating some distinctive kind of C-
fiber neural activity, even based on functionalism of the mind 9, which permits multiple realizability of 
mental states (beliefs, desires, being in pain, etc.). 
7) There may be many approaches to realization of conscious machines, but the technological levels of 
perceiving sensors and pattern recognition largely determine the limits of their subjective worlds (i.e. 
what these machines can observe), and the limits of their conscious intelligence. According to the 
Principle of World’s Relativity, the subjective world an intelligent machine can observe is strongly 
constrained by the way it perceives the objective world. Thus, the machine can be equipped with people-
different sensors, in order to be able to see polarized light and electromagnetic field, to hear ultrasound 
and infrasound, to detect ultraviolet and infrared, and so on. According to the Principle of Symbol’s 
Relativity, an intelligent machine can use any physical symbol system to express what it observes in its 
subjective world. Thus, the machine can be equipped with people-different language (e.g. radio 
language), in order to be able to formulate thoughts and communicate information with other machines 
of the same kind. 
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8) Under the guidance of TCR, conscious machines should have some in-built reflexes play a role and 
employ the minimum requirement of perception to start with their bare-bones conscious experience of 
existence and non-existence about something. Then, the machines should get inspired from genetic 
epistemology to acquire physical knowledge gradually with many types of perception for more complex 
consciousness. Finally, they could use physical symbols to further develop and improve their conscious 
intelligence by inventing more abstract knowledge through actions, and by learning social knowledge 
from other machines of the same kind. Note that the physical forms of knowledge should be closely 
related to their perceiving sensors and responding effectors. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this article, two first principles, namely, the Principle of World’s Relativity and the Principle of Symbol’s 
Relativity, have been proposed to elucidate the nature of intelligence comprehensively at the system level. 
Notably, the two first principles are fundamental as well as compatible in all phenomena of intelligence. 
They are independent of physics, chemistry and biology, and cannot be reduced to any principles of these 
sciences. In fact, they can be arguably regarded some “sciphi” perspectives, which belong to a theoretical 
level between science and philosophy. On the one hand, the two principles allow an intelligent agent to have 
many perceiving sensors implemented in different sciences, meaning that they are beyond science; on the 
other hand, the two principles can make not only speculative philosophical explanations, but also testable 
scientific predictions (e.g. radio language in the thought experiment “robonauts in space exploration”), 
meaning that they are below philosophy. Moreover, their importance and necessity have been shown by 
thought experiments to solve the mind-body problem. Hence, they have significances to establish a scientific 
theory of mind and consciousness, which is becoming a new paradigm for intelligence science. This is also a 
“sciphi” paradigm, called the Theory of Cognitive Relativity, with an abbreviation of TCR. 
Rather than brain-like intelligence, the TCR indeed advocates a promising approach to true AI, especially 
with artificial consciousness different from humans’ and animals’. Like theoretical physics (e.g. Newtonian 
mechanics, quantum mechanics and theory of relativity) with a core of first principles, the core of the TCR is 
defined as a simple and elegant set of first principles, at least including the Principle of World’s Relativity 
and the Principle of Symbol’s Relativity. The Principle of World's Relativity can bridge between the 
subjective world of an intelligent agent and the objective world it perceives through physical interactions 
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with sensors and effectors. The Principle of Symbol’s Relativity can help design physical forms of language 
for the agent to think and communicate appropriately. From the point of TCR’s view, a computational model 
of brain will not be sufficient to explain the consciousness of human brain. The best explanation of a brain’s 
consciousness is the brain itself, not its model. Even if a model of a brain has a consciousness, the model’s 
consciousness may not be the brain’s consciousness at all. In practice, true AI should center on realization of 
intelligent machines with subjective worlds that can be different from the human world and the animal 
worlds. These machines may have no vision, no hearing, no smell, no taste, and no touch. Instead, they can 
have people-different senses, such as of polarized light, electric field, magnetic field, ultrasound, infrasound, 
ultraviolet and infrared. Moreover, they can think and communicate in radio language rather than sound 
language. In short, true AI can be realized in a brain-different way, though it may be inspired by 
neuroscience (Hassabis et al. 2017). The brain-like intelligence tries to achieve intelligence as demonstrated 
by brains (Sendhoff et al. 2009), preferably of highly evolved creatures. However, the nature of intelligence 
may have something similar to the secret of flight. The flight of an airplane does not need to flap its wings 
like a bird. This bird-different flight is based on aerodynamics, not on imitation of the biological bird. 
Logically, aerodynamics can be described without biological terms. Therefore, intelligence science should be 
expected a theory independent of the biological brain. Without biological terms, the science would be able to 
explain how an agent’s conscious intelligence arises from its physical interactions between the subjective 
world and the objective world. Furthermore, the science would make a guide to diverse realizations of true 
AI in a brain-different way. Finally, based on the intelligence science, the insights for true AI and the creed 
for consciousness studies, the TCR would probably drive an intelligence revolution in combination with 
some additional first principles. 
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NOTES 
1. The ampullae of Lorenzini are special sensing organs called electroreceptors, forming a network of jelly-filled 
pores. They are mostly discussed as being found in cartilaginous fish (sharks, rays, and chimaeras). For more 
information, please access https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ampullae_of_Lorenzini. 
2. Grapes are known to be highly toxic to dogs, though research has yet to pinpoint exactly which substance in the 
fruit causes this reaction. Please access https://www.akc.org/expert-advice/nutrition/can-dogs-eat-grapes/. 
3. The principle of relativity is the requirement that the equations describing the laws of physics have the same form 
in all admissible frames of reference. Please access https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_relativity. 
4. Please access https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain_in_a_vat, for more information about the “brain in a vat”, 
including Figure 5. 
5. The self-refuting argument, “they are brains in a vat,” or “we are brains in a vat”, could be found in the article at 
https://philosophy.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/Brains%20in%20a%20Vat%20-%20Hilary%20Putnam.pdf. 
6. This definition of consciousness could be found at https://www.britannica.com/topic/consciousness. 
7. Kirobo is the first talking robot astronaut in the world, tasked to be a companion. More information available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/space/10221399/Talking-robot-astronaut-blasts-into-space.html. 
8. Please access https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind, for more information about the 
computational theory of mind. 
9. Functionalism of the mind claims that mental states (e.g. beliefs and desires) are constituted solely by their 
functional role. That is, they have causal relations to other mental states, numerous sensory inputs, and behavioral 
outputs. More information available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind). 
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